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Combination of decision procedures
Equational theories
a b s t r a c t
Most of the decision procedures for symbolic analysis of protocols are limited to a fixed
set of algebraic operators associated with a fixed intruder theory. Examples of such sets of
operators comprise XOR, multiplication, abstract encryption/decryption. In this report we
give an algorithm for combining decision procedures for arbitrary intruder theories with
disjoint sets of operators, provided that solvability of ordered intruder constraints, a slight
generalization of intruder constraints, can be decided in each theory. This is the case for
most of the intruder theories for which a decision procedure has been given. In particular
our result allows us to decide trace-based security properties of protocols that employ any
combination of the above mentioned operators with a bounded number of sessions.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Algebraic operators for cryptographic protocol analysis
Recently many procedures have been proposed to decide the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in the Dolev–Yao
model w.r.t. a finite number of protocol sessions [1–5]. Among the different approaches, the symbolic ones [4,6–8] are
based on reducing the problem to constraint solving in a term algebra. This reduction has proved to be quite effective on
standard benchmarks [9] and has also permitted us to discover new flaws on several protocols [8,10].
However, while most formal analysis of security protocols abstracts from low-level properties, i.e. certain algebraic
properties of encryption such as themultiplicativity of RSA or the properties induced by chainingmethods for block ciphers,
many real attacks and protocol weaknesses rely on these properties (for a survey see [11]). For attacks exploiting the XOR
properties in the context ofmobile communications see [12]. Also the specification of Just Fast Keying protocol (an alternative
to IKE) in [13] employs a set constructor that is idempotent and commutative and a Diffie–Hellman exponentiation operator
with the property (gy)z = (gz)y.
At an intermediate level encryption and decryption operations are sometimes defined by explicit constructors and
destructors as in [14,15]. This allows us to have a simple communication scheme similar to the applied pi calculus of Abadi
and Fournet [16]. This approach has also the advantage of revealing some new flaws in protocols [14]. It can be handled by
several analysis tools (at least for basic encryption/decryption theory) such as the NRL analyzer [17] and TRUST system [1].
In this articlewe present a general procedure for deciding the security of protocols in the presence of algebraic properties.
This procedure relies on the combination of constraint solving algorithm for disjoint intruder theories, provided that
solvability of ordered intruder constraints, a slight generalization of intruder constraints, can be decided in each theory.
Such combination algorithm already exists for solving E-unification problems [18,19]. We have extended it in order to solve
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intruder constraints on disjoint signatures. This extension is nontrivial since intruder deduction rules allow one to build
contexts above terms and therefore add some second-order features to the standard first-order E-unification problem.
Our approach is more modular than the previous ones and it allows us to decide interesting intruder theories that could
not be considered before by reducing them to simpler and independent theories. For instance it allows one to combine the
abelian group theory of [20] with the XOR theory of [21]. This allows one to decide security protocols at a more concrete
level where encryption is described by mathematical functions.
1.2. A protocol with several algebraic operators
We consider in this section the Needham–Schroeder Public Key protocol. This well-known protocol is described in the
Alice and Bob notation by the following sequence of messages, where the comma denotes a pairing of messages and {M}Ka
denotes the encryption by the public key Ka of A.
A→ B : {Na, A}Kb
B→ A : {Na,Nb}Ka
A→ B : {Nb}Kb
Assume now that the encryption algorithm follows El-Gamal encryption scheme. The public key of A is defined by three
publicly-available parameters: a modulus pa, a base ga and the proper public key gaa mod pa. The private key of A is a.
Denoting expp the exponentiation modulo p and×p the multiplication modulo ϕ(p), and with new nonces k1, k2 and k3 we
can rewrite the protocol as:
A→ B : exppb(gb, k1), (Na, A)⊕ exppb(exppb(gb, b), k1)
B→ A : exppa(ga, k2), (Na,Nb)⊕ exppa(exppa(ga, a), k2)
A→ B : exppb(gb, k3), (Nb)⊕ exppb(exppb(gb, b), k3)
In this simple example we would like to model the group properties of the Exclusive-or (⊕), the associativity of
exponential ((xy)z = xy×z), the group property of the exponents. Several works have already been achieved toward taking
into account these algebraic properties for detecting attacks on a bounded number of sessions. Some procedures have been
proposed for specific theories like Exclusive-or, abelian groups (with exponential), . . . However none of these can analyse
protocols combining several algebraic operators like the example above. The algorithm given in this paper will permit us to
decide trace-based security properties of such protocols.
1.3. Examples of intruder theories
A convenient way to specify intruder theories in the context of cryptographic protocols is by giving a set L of deduction
rules that tell how the intruder can construct new messages from the one she already knows and a set of equational laws E
that are verified by the functions that are employed in messages. These equations will be further processed as rewrite rules
in order to obtain a (possibly infinite) rewrite system R. We give here examples of intruder theories. These examples are
developed in Section 7.
1.3.1. Dolev–Yao theory with explicit destructors
The intruder is given with a pairing operator and two projections to retrieve the components of a pair. There is a







x, y→ se(x, y)





sd(se(x, y), y)= x
Note that this theory is itself the union of two simpler disjoint theories, one with solely the pairing operator and the
projections and the other with the explicit encryption and decryption operators.
1.3.2. XOR theory
The theory of the eXclusive-OR operator · ⊕ · is given by the following set L⊕ of deduction rules and equations E⊕ over
terms, where 0 is a constant:
L⊕
{
x, y→ x⊕ y
→ 0 E⊕

(x⊕ y)⊕ z = x⊕ (y⊕ z)
x⊕ y= y⊕ x
0⊕ x= x
x⊕ x= 0
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1.3.3. Abelian group theory
For some protocols the messages can be considered as elements of an abelian group. Here we assume here there is only




x, y→ x× y
E×

(x× y)× z = x× (y× z)




Recently several protocol decision procedures have been designed for handling algebraic properties in the Dolev–Yao
model [22–24,21]. These works have been concerned by fixed equational theories corresponding to a fixed intruder power.
A couple of works only have tried to derive generic decidability results for class of intruder theories. For instance, in [15]
Delaune and Jacquemard consider the class of public collapsing theories. These theories have to be presented by rewrite
systems where the right-hand side of every rule is a ground term or a variable, which is a strong restriction. Comon and
Treinen [25,26] have also investigated general conditions on theories for deciding insecurity with passive intruders.
1.5. Outline
In Section 2 we will first define basic notions about terms, substitutions and ordered term rewriting. Then we introduce
the notion of subterm value which is a notion of subterm specific to this article. We then give some properties of subterm
values with respect to term replacement operations.
In Section 3 we first give our modeling of an intruder in Section 3.1. We also prove the existence of special sequences
of deductions called well-formed derivations. Then we introduce the model for cryptographic protocols we will base our
analysis on (Section 3.2). Then we give a reduction of some trace-based security properties to the feasibility of a protocol
execution. Finally we define constraint systems in Section 3.3, such that their satisfiability expresses the feasibility of a
protocol execution.
In Section 4 we define for a constraint system C a special kind of substitutions called bound substitutions. We prove that
whenever a constraint system C is satisfiable it is satisfied by a bound substitution. We also prove that these substitutions
are conservative with respect to the subterms of C i.e. after application of a bound substitution the number of subterms of
C does not increase.
These results permit us to define a combination algorithm for solving constraint systems for the union of two intruders
over disjoint signatures in Section 5. We prove its soundness and completeness. The main disadvantage of this algorithm
is that the input constraint systems in the subsystems are not necessarily deterministic. This is a major drawback since
all decision procedures given so far assume the constraint systems are deterministic (the only exception is the conference
paper [27] but its long version [20] comes back to a similar notion that has to be dynamically checked during the verification
process.)
This leads us to prove that the combination algorithm can be adapted so that it suffices to decide the satisfiability of
deterministic constraint systems in sub-theories. While a direct proof can be written, we have preferred to put the required
definitions and lemmas for this proof in a separate Section 6 in order to ease the reading.
Finally we give in Section 7 some complexity results for the constraint satisfiability problem in some intruder theories.
The bounds we give are tight and permit one to extend some previously known complexity results on security protocol
analysis as well as to derive new ones.
2. Terms and subterms
2.1. Basic notions
We consider an infinite set of free constants C and an infinite set of variablesX. For all signatures G (i.e. a set of function
symbols with arities), we denote by T(G) (resp. T(G,X)) the set of terms over G ∪ C (resp. G ∪ C ∪X). The former is called
the set of ground terms over G, while the later is simply called the set of terms over G. Variables are denoted by x, y, terms
are denoted by s, t , u, v, and finite sets of terms are written E, F , ..., and decorations thereof, respectively. We abbreviate
E ∪ F by E, F , the union E ∪ {t} by E, t and E \ {t} by E \ t .
In a signatureG a constant is either a free constant or a function symbol of arity 0 inG. Given a term t we denote by Var(t)
the set of variables occurring in t and by Cons(t) the set of constants occurring in t . We denote by Atoms(t) the set Var(t)∪
Cons(t). A substitution σ is an involutive mapping fromX to T(G,X) such that Supp(σ ) = {x|σ(x) 6= x}, the support of σ ,
is a finite set. The application of a substitution σ to a term t (resp. a set of terms E) is denoted tσ (resp. Eσ ) and is equal to
the term t (resp. E) where all variables x have been replaced by the term xσ . A substitution σ is groundw.r.t. G if the image
of Supp(σ ) is included in T(G).
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An equational presentation H = (G, A) is defined by a set A of equations u = v with u, v ∈ T(G,X). For any equa-
tional presentation H the relation =H denotes the equational theory generated by (G, A) on T(G,X), that is the smallest
congruence containing all instances of axioms of A. By abuse of terminology we do not distinguish between an equational
presentationH over a signature G and a set A of equations presenting it and we denote bothH . We will also often refer to
H as an equational theory (meaning the equational theory presented byH). An equational theoryH is consistent if there
exists at least onemodel ofH withmore than one element. Equivalently a theoryH is consistent if there does not exist two
free constants x and y such that x 6= y and x =H y.
The syntactic subterms of a term t are denoted Subsyn(t) and are defined recursively as follows. If t is a variable or a
constant then Subsyn(t) = {t}. If t = f (t1, . . . , tn) then Subsyn(t) = {t} ∪ ⋃ni=1 Subsyn(ti). The positions in a term t are
sequences of integers defined recursively as follows,  being the empty sequence. The term t is at position  in t . If u is a
syntactic subterm of t at position p and if u = f (u1, . . . , un) then ui is at position p · i in t for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We denote by
t[p ← s] the term obtained by replacing in t the syntactic subterm at position p by s and we denote t(s1, . . . , sm) a term
that admits s1 . . . sm among its syntactic subterms. We write t[s] to denote a term t where s is a syntactic subterm of t .
2.2. Union of theories
In this paper, we consider 2 disjoint signatures F1 and F2, a consistent equational theory E1 (resp. E2) on F1 (resp. F2).
We denote by F the union of the signatures F1 and F2 and by E the union of the theories E1 and E2. A term t in T(F1,X)
(resp. in T(F2,X)) is called a pure 1-term (resp. a pure 2-term). We denote by Sign(·) the function that associates to each
term t 6∈ C∪X the signature (F1 or F2) of its root symbol. For t ∈ C∪Xwe define Sign(t) = ⊥, with⊥ a new symbol. The
term s is alien to u if Sign(s) 6= Sign(u). We introduce now the subterm values of a term t . They are the syntactic subterms of
t that are either equal to t or a strict maximal alien syntactic subterm of a subterm value of t .
Definition 1 (Factors). The set of factors of a term t is denoted Factors(t) and is the set of maximal syntactic strict subterms
of t that are either alien to t or atoms.
Example 1. Consider F1 = {⊕, a, b, c} and F2 = {f }where f has arity 1. Then{Factors(f (f (a))⊕ (b⊕ c))= {f (f (a)), b, c}
Factors(f (f (f (b)⊕ c)))= {f (b)⊕ c}
Factors(0)= ∅
We now define the notion of subterm values.
Definition 2 (Subterms). Given a term t , the set of its subterm values is denoted by Sub(t) and is defined recursively by
Sub(t) = {t} ∪⋃u∈Factors(t) Sub(u).
By extension, for a set of terms E, the set Sub(E) is defined as the union of the subterms values of the elements of E.
Example 2. Consider F1 and F2 as in Example 1. Then{Sub(f (f (a))⊕ (b⊕ c))= {f (f (a))⊕ (b⊕ c), f (f (a)), a, b, c}
Sub(f (f (f (b)⊕ c)))= {f (f (f (b)⊕ c)), f (b)⊕ c, f (b), b, c}
Sub(0)= {0}
This shows the difference with the notion of syntactic subterms.
In the rest of this paper and unless otherwise indicated, the notion of subterm will refer to subterm values.
2.3. Congruences and ordered rewriting
In this subsection we shall introduce the notion of ordered rewriting [28] which is a useful tool that has been utilized
(e.g. [19]) for proving the correctness of combination of unification algorithms. Let< be a simplification ordering on T(G)1
assumed to be total on T(G) and such that
• the minimum for< is a constant cmin ∈ C;
• non-free constants are smaller than any non-constant ground term.
Given a possibly infinite set of equationsO on the signature T(G)wedefine the ordered rewriting relation→O by s→O s′
iff there exists a position p in s, an equation l = r in O and a substitution τ such that s = s[p← gτ ], s′ = s[p← rτ ], and
lτ > rτ .
It has been shown (see [29,28]) that by applying the unfailing completion procedure to a set of equationsH we can derive
a (possibly infinite) set of equations O such that:
1 By definition< satisfies for all s, t, u ∈ T(G) s < t[s] and s < u implies t[s] < t[u].
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1. the congruence relations=O and=H are equal on T(F ).
2. the ordered rewrite relation→O is convergent (i.e. terminating and confluent) on T(F ).
We shall say that O is an o-completion ofH .
From now for sake of conciseness whenwewill say ‘‘the rewrite system→O ’’ this will mean ‘‘the ordered rewrite relation
→O ’’, when will say ‘‘by convergence of O’’, we will mean ‘‘by convergence of→O on ground terms’’.
The rewrite system→O being convergent on ground termswe can define (t)↓O as the unique normal form of the ground
term t for→O . A ground term t is in normal form, or normalized, if t = (t)↓O . Given a ground substitution σ we denote
by (σ )↓O the substitution with the same support such that for all variables x ∈ Supp(σ ) we have x(σ )↓O = (xσ)↓O . A
substitution σ is normal if σ = (σ )↓O .
2.3.0.1. Notations in this article. Applying unfailing completion to E = E1 ∪ E2, it is easy to notice [19] that the set of
generated equations R is the disjoint union of the two systems R1 and R2 also obtained by applying unfailing completion
procedures to E1 and to E2 respectively. (Since F1 ∩ F2 = ∅ and the Ei are assumed to be consistent i.e. the identity x =Ei y
does not hold in either theory, the critical pair generation will produce only pure equations.) To the end of the section we
abbreviate (t)↓R in (t)↓. We denote by Cspe the set containing the constants in F and cmin.
First let us show that when normalizing a term with R, we can handle equations introducing new variables by replacing
these variables by the minimal constant cmin:
Lemma 1. Assume that l = r ∈ R, z ∈ Var(r) \ Var(l), and s→R s′ with s = s[p← lτ ], s′ = s[p← rτ ], lτ > rτ . Let us define
the substitution σ such that for all variables x 6= z we have xσ = xτ and zσ = cmin. Then we have also: s→R s[p← rσ ].
Proof. We only need to notice that lτ > rτ implies lσ > rσ since lτ = lσ and rτ > rσ by the monotonicity properties of
simplification orderings. 
Lemma 2. IfH is a consistent equational theory then for any equation l = r in a presentation ofH if there exists a substitution
τ such that lτ > rτ then l is not a variable.
Proof. By contradiction assume that l is a variable and that there exists a ground substitution τ such that lτ > rτ . By the
subterm property of simplification orderings we have l /∈ Var(r). Let τ1 and τ2 be two substitutions of support Var(r) ∪ {l}
and equal to τ on Var(r) and such that lτ1 and lτ2 are two different free constants. We have lτ1 =H rτ1 = rτ = rτ2 =H lτ2.
This contradicts the fact thatH is consistent. 
The following lemma is an easy to prove but nonetheless fundamental result.
Lemma 3. Assume a non-constant ground term t has all its factors in normal form. Then either (t)↓ ∈ Cspe∪Factors(t) or Sign(t)
= Sign((t)↓) and Factors((t)↓) ⊆ Cspe ∪ Factors(t).
Proof. The assumption that t is a non-constant ground term implies Factors(t) 6= ∅ and Sign(t) 6= ⊥. If t is in normal form
the result is trivial.
Otherwise consider a sequence of applications of rules of R: t = t0 →R . . .→R tn = t ′ and assume that at each step i for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the term ti is minimal for< among the terms r such that ti−1 →R r .
Let 0 ≤ i ≤ n be the last step in this sequence such that ti ∈ Cspe ∪ Factors(t) or Sign(t) = Sign(ti) and Factors(ti) ⊆
Cspe ∪ Factors(t).
By contradiction assume i < n and assume the equation l = r ∈ R is applied on ti with substitution τ to yield ti+1 with
lτ > rτ . Theminimality of ti+1 among terms u such that ti →R u and Lemma 1 imply that for all variables x in Var(r)\Var(l)
we have xτ = cmin. By construction of R the terms l and r are pure terms and the constants occurring in l and r are non-free
constants.
By Lemma 2, l is not a variable and thus Sign(lτ) 6= ⊥. The choice of < implies that if l is a constant then so is r .
In this case they are both in Cspe and we are done. Let us assume now the set of factors of lτ is not empty. Since the
factors of ti are in normal form the rule is applied above the factors of ti. Thus we must have Sign(ti) = Sign(l) and
Factors(lτ) ⊆ Cspe ∪ Factors(ti). Thus for each variable x ∈ Var(l) either xτ ∈ Factors(ti) or Factors(xτ) ⊆ Factors(ti)
and Sign(xτ) = Sign(ti).
The remark above implies that:
• either r is a variable and rτ is a factor of t or in Cspe;
• or the factors of rτ are either in Cspe or are factors of t .
Now if the rule is applied at position  on t and if we are in the first case we have ti+1 ∈ Factors(ti) ∪ Cspe. Else we
necessarily have Sign(ti+1) = Sign(ti) and the above cases imply that Factors(ti+1) ⊆ Cspe∪Factors(ti). Both cases contradict
the maximality of i and thus that i < n. Together with tn = (t)↓ this implies the Lemma. 
In the rest of this paper we will often use without justification the following consequence of Lemma 3. First we see that
if the factors of a term t are in normal form we have:
Sub((t)↓) ⊆ (Sub(t))↓ ∪ Cspe
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By iterating along a bottom-up normalisation of a ground term t this inclusion also holds for any ground term t . A useful
case is when t is not ground but a ground, normalized substitution σ is applied on t . In this case we have Sub(tσ) ⊆
Sub(t)σ ∪ Sub(σ ). Since the substitution σ is normal this leads to the following inclusion:
Sub((tσ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(t)σ )↓ ∪ Sub(σ ) ∪ Cspe
2.4. Normalisation and replacement
The following lemma states that if all factors of a term t are in normal form then the replacement of one of these factors
commutes with the normalisation of t .
IfΠ is a set of positions in term t we denote by t[Π ← v] the term obtained by putting v at all positions of t that are in
Π . We denote δu,v the replacement of u by v such that if u appears at positionsΠu as a subterm (i.e. as a subterm value) of t
then tδu = t[Πu ← v]. We denote in short δu the replacement δu,cmin .
Lemma 4. Let t be a term such that its factors are in normal form. Let u and v be two ground terms with u ∈ Factors(t) and
u 6= (t)↓. Then (tδu,v)↓ = ((t)↓δu,v)↓.
Proof. First since u is a factor of t either u is alien to t or u is a constant in the same theory as t . We consider here only the
first case, the second one being similar since u is in normal form.
Consider a sequence of rewrite steps: t →s1 t1 →s2 t2 · · · →sn tn = (t)↓, using rules s1, . . . sn ∈ R and wlog assume
Sign(t) = F1 and thus Sign(u) 6= F1.
Since the terms in Factors(t) are in normal form we have that all si with i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are in R1. Thus the left-hand side
and the right-hand side of these rules are pure 1-terms. By Lemma 2 the left-hand side of si is not a variable x.
Thus u alien to t implies it is alien to all left-hand sides of rewrite rules applied. These remarks lead to the following
claim.
Claim 3. ti−1 →si ti implies ti−1δu,v =R1 tiδu,v .
Proof of the claim. Let pi be the position in ti−1 at which the rule si is applied and let li be the left-hand side of ri andΘ be
the set of positions of variables in li. LetΠ be the set of positions at which u appears as a subterm in ti−1. The above remarks
imply u is alien to li. Thus for all p ∈ Π we have either pi is not a prefix of p or there exists θ ∈ Θ such that pi · θ is a prefix
of p. This implies the claim. ♦
Iterating the claim along the sequence of rule applications for normalizing t yields tδu,v =R (t)↓δu,v by transitivity of =R.
Since R is ground convergent this implies (tδu,v)↓ =R ((t)↓δu,v)↓. 
A ground term s is said to be bound by σ to the term t in U if there exists t ∈ U such that (tσ)↓ = s. A ground term
s which is not bound to any term in U is said to be free in U . The following lemma permits us to define a new substitution
after the replacement of a free subterm of the solution σ .
Lemma 5. Let t be a term and σ be a normalized substitution. Assume s is free in Sub(t) for σ and let σ ′ = (σδs)↓. We have:
((tσ)↓δs)↓ = (tσ ′)↓
Proof. Since R is ground convergent it is sufficient to prove:
(tσ)↓δs =R tσ ′
For all variables xwe have xσ ′ =R x(σδs) by definition of σ ′, and thus:
tσ ′ =R t(σδs)
Since s is free and normalized, there is no subterm r of t such that rσ = s. Thus:
t(σδs) =R (tσ)δs
Moreover we have (tσ)↓ =R tσ . Since σ is normalized we have Sub((tσ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(t)σ )↓ ∪ Sub(σ ) and Sub(tσ) ⊆
Sub(t)σ ∪ Sub(σ ). Since s is free and normalized it is neither in Sub(t)σ nor in (Sub(t)σ )↓. Thus we have:
((tσ)↓)δs =R (tσ)δs
Hence we have (tσ)↓δs =R tσ ′ which completes the proof. 
Lemma 6. For all normal substitutions σ , for all terms m and for all s ∈ Sub((mσ)↓) one of the following holds:
• s ∈ Cspe;
• There is u ∈ Sub(m) such that (uσ)↓ = s and Sign(u) = Sign(s);
• There exists x ∈ Var(m) such that s ∈ Sub(xσ).
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Proof. Letm and s be two terms and let σ be a ground substitution such that s ∈ Sub((mσ)↓). We have
Sub((mσ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(m)σ )↓ ∪ Sub(Var(m)σ ) ∪ Cspe
Assume there exists no x ∈ Var(m) such that s ∈ Sub(xσ) and s 6∈ Cspe. Let u ∈ Sub(m) be minimal for the subterm relation
such that (uσ)↓ = s. The above inclusion and s /∈ Sub(Var(m)σ ) ∪ Cspe imply u is well defined. If it is a free constant we
have necessarily u = s and Sign(u) = Sign(s) = ⊥. Assume now u is neither a constant or a variable and thus Factors(u) is
not empty.
By minimality of u we have s /∈ ((Sub(u) \ {u})σ )↓. Thus for all v in Sub(u) \ {u} the above inclusion (replacing m by
v) imply s /∈ Sub((vσ )↓). Consider now a bottom-up normalisation of uσ stopping at factors of u and let t be the obtained
term. By Lemma 3 and s 6∈ Cspe ∪ Factors(t) we have Sign(t) = Sign(s). By definition of t we have Sign(t) = Sign(u) and
therefore there exists u ∈ Sub(m) such that (uσ)↓ = s and Sign(u) = Sign(s). 
3. Protocols, intruders and constraint systems
Security of a given protocol is assessed with respect to a class of environments in which the protocol is executed. Dolev
and Yao [30] have proposed to model an environment not in terms of possible attacks on the protocol but by deductions
that an intruder attacking a protocol execution is able to perform.
In Section 3.1 we define an extension of Dolev–Yao’s model to arbitrary operators that models the possible deductions of
the intruder. In Section 3.2 we describe the execution of a protocol within a hostile environment controlled by the intruder
and in Section 3.3 we describe how we model this execution by constraint systems.
3.1. Intruder deduction systems
3.1.1. Deduction rules
We shall modelmessages as ground terms and intruder deduction rules as rewrite rules on sets ofmessages representing
the knowledge of an intruder. The intruder derives newmessages from a given (finite) set of messages by applying intruder
rules. Sincewe assume some equational axiomsH are satisfied by the function symbols in the signature, all these derivations
have to be consideredmodulo the equational congruence=H generated by these axioms.
An intruder deduction rule in our setting is specified by a term t in some signature G. Given values for the variables of t
the intruder is able to generate the corresponding instance of t .
Definition 4. An intruder system I is given by a triple 〈G, S,H〉 where G is a signature, S ⊆ T(G,X) and H is a set of
equations between terms in T(G,X). To each t ∈ S we associate a deduction rule Lt : Var(t)→ t and Lt,g denotes the set of
ground instances of the rule Lt moduloH :
Lt,g = {l→ r | ∃σ , ground substitution on G, l = Var(t)σ and r =H tσ }
The set of rules LI is defined as the union of the sets Lt,g for all t ∈ S.
Each rule l→ r in LI defines an intruder deduction relation→l→r between finite sets of terms. Given two finite sets of
terms E and F we define E →l→r F if and only if l ⊆ E and F = E ∪ {r}. We denote→I the union of the relations→l→r for
all l→ r in LI and by→∗I the transitive closure of→I. We simply denote by→ the relation→I when there is no ambiguity
about I.
The next result will allow us to restrict our study to deductions with normalized terms:
Lemma 7. We assume that R is a rewrite system that is terminating and confluent on ground terms such that=R and=E are the
same relations. Then given two sets of ground terms E and F , there is a deduction E → F iff there is a deduction (E)↓ → (F)↓.
For instance we can define I× = 〈{×, i, 1}, {x× y, i(x), 1}, E×〉 and we have a, b, c →I× a, b, c, c × a.
A derivation D of length n, n ≥ 0, is a sequence of steps of the form E0 →I E0, t1 →I · · · →I En with finite sets of ground
terms E0, . . . En, and ground terms t1, . . . , tn, such that Ei = Ei−1∪{ti} for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. A derivation iswithout stutter
if for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ti = tj implies i = j. The term tn is called the goal of the derivation. We define EI to be equal to the
set
{
t | ∃F s.t. E →∗I F and t ∈ F
}
i.e. the set of terms that can be derived from E. If there is no ambiguity on the deduction
system I we write E instead of E
I
.
Let O be an o-completion ofH . By Lemma 7 we will assume from now that all the deduction rules generate terms that
are normalized by→O and the goal and the initial set are in normal form for→O .
3.1.2. Union of intruder deduction systems
Given a set of terms S ⊆ T(G,X)we define the set of terms 〈S〉 to be theminimal set such that S ⊆ 〈S〉 and for all t ∈ 〈S〉
and for all substitutions σ with image included in 〈S〉, we have tσ ∈ 〈S〉. Hence terms in 〈S〉 are built by composing terms
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in S iteratively. We can prove easily that the intruder systems I = 〈G, S,H〉 and J = 〈G, 〈S〉 ,H〉 define the same sets of
derivable terms, i.e. for all E we have E
I = EJ .
We want to consider now the union of 2 intruder systems: I1 = 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and I2 = 〈F2, S2, E2〉. In particular we
are interested in the derivations obtained by using→I1 ∪ →I2 . It can be noticed that 〈S1 ∪ S2〉 = 〈〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉〉. Hence
by the remarks above the derivable terms using 〈S1 ∪ S2〉 or 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 are the same. For technical reasons it will be more
convenient to use 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 for defining the union of 2 intruder systems:
Definition 5. The union of the two intruder systems I1 = 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and I2 = 〈F2, S2, E2〉 is the intruder system U =
〈F1 ∪ F2, 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 , E1 ∪ E2〉 .
From now we assume that deduction steps refer to the intruder systemU = 〈F1 ∪ F2, 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 , E1 ∪ E2〉.
3.1.3. Properties of one-step deductions
First we prove some properties that are local to a given deduction in a derivation.
To begin with, we prove that, informally, if the set of subterms changes after a deduction of a term by a rule in Lu,g, then
the only possible change is the addition of a term swith Sign(u) = Sign(s).
Lemma 8. Let E and F be two finite sets of normalized terms and let E →Lu,g F be a deduction and assume that Sub(E)∪ Cspe 6=
Sub(F) ∪ Cspe. Then F = E, s, with Sub(F) = Sub(E) ∪ {s} and Sign(u) = Sign(s).
Proof. Let the rule applied be:
u1, u2, . . . , uk → (u(u1, . . . , uk))↓ = ti
and let v = u(u1, . . . , uk). Since E is normalized the ui are in normal form. Since u is pure, by definition of factors we have
Factors(v) ⊆ Sub(u1, . . . , uk) ∪ Cspe. We can conclude from this:
• Sub((v)↓) ⊆ {(v)↓} ∪ Sub(u1, . . . , uk) ∪ Cspe
• If Sign(v) 6= Sign((v)↓)we have (v)↓ ∈ Cspe ∪ Sub(u1, . . . , uk) ⊆ Sub(E) ∪ Cspe by Lemma 3.
The lemma then follows directly from Sub(E, (v)↓) ∪ Cspe 6= Sub(E) ∪ Cspe. 
Lemma 9. Let D be a derivation and l→ r ∈ Lu,g a rule applied in D. Then for each s ∈ l if there is a rule ls → s ∈ Lv,g applied
in D we can assume Sign(u) 6= Sign(v).
Proof. By contradiction. LetD be the set of derivations for which the lemma does not hold and let D ∈ D with a minimal
number of rules application that does not satisfy the lemma. Let l → r ∈ Lu,g be the first of these rules. Let s ∈ l be an
instance of a variable xs of u such that there exists a rule ls → s ∈ Lvs,g in Dwith Sign(u) = Sign(vs). Assume that the term
u has been chosen such that the number of such variables is minimal.
Since u and v are in the same theory wlog we can assume u, v ∈ 〈S1〉 and let u′ = u[xs ← vs]. By definition of 〈S1〉 we
have u′ ∈ 〈S1〉. In Lu′,g there is a rule
l, ls \ {s} → tj
This contradicts the minimality of the number of variables, and thus the fact that the lemma does not hold on this rule and
finally the minimality of D inD . ThusD is empty. 
The following lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 8 that will be used throughout this paper.
Lemma 10. Let D : E0 → · · · → En be a derivation where the Ei are normalized for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and assume there exists
s ∈ Sub(Ei) \ (Sub(E0)∪ Cspe). Then there exists in D a step Ej−1 →ls→s Ej with j ≤ i and ls → s ∈ Lu,g with Sign(u) = Sign(s).
Proof. Consider the minimal index j such that s ∈ Sub(Ej). By hypothesis we have j > 0 and j ≤ i. Moreover by minimality
of j we have Sub(Ej) 6= Sub(Ej−1). Since s /∈ Cspe Lemma 8 implies that Ej = Ej−1, s, and that if Ej−1 →ls→s= Ej with
ls → s ∈ Lu,g then Sign(u) = Sign(s). 
Lemma 11. Let l→ r be a rule in Lu,g and s ∈ l with Sign(s) 6= Sign(u) and s 6= r. Then (lδs)↓ → (rδs)↓ is also a rule in Lu,g.
Proof. Consider t = u(l). Its factors are in normal form, s, cmin are alien to t and s is a factor of t and s 6= (t)↓. Therefore by
Lemma 4 we have (tδs)↓ = (u((lδs)↓))↓. 
Y. Chevalier, M. Rusinowitch / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 1261–1282 1269
3.1.4. Well-formed derivations
A derivation E0 →U E0, t1 →U · · · →U En of intruder system U is well-formed if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have
ti ∈ Sub(E0, tn) ∪ Cspe; in other words every message generated by an intermediate step either occurs in the goal, in the
initial set of messages or is a special constant. In next lemma we assume E and t are in normal form and that all terms
produced in a derivation are in normal form.
Lemma 12. A derivation of minimal length starting from E of goal t is well-formed.
Proof. Let n be the length of D, and let {t1, . . . , tn} be such that t = tn and
D : E → E, t1 → E, t1, t2 → · · · → E, t1, . . . , tn
By minimality D is without stutter. By contradiction assume that i is the maximal index such that ti 6∈ Sub(E0, tn) ∪ Cspe.
Since ti /∈ Sub(E0, tn) ∪ Cspe we have i < n.
By Lemma 10we have ti /∈ Sub(E0)∪Cspe implies ti /∈ Sub(Ei−1)∪Cspe. Let li → ti ∈ Lu,g such that Ei−1 → Ei. By Lemma 8
this implies Sign(u) = Sign(ti).
By minimality of D the term ti has to be used in the left-hand side of a subsequent step in the derivation (otherwise the
step producing ti can be avoided). Let us introduce the non-empty setΩ of step indices iwhere ti has to be used in left-hand
side. More precisely
Ω = {h | Eh−1 → Eh ∈ D and Eh−1 \ {ti} 6→ Eh \ {ti}}
Let j be the minimum element of Ω and let lj → tj ∈ Lv,g be the j-th deduction rule in derivation D. Note that j > i and
thus by maximality of iwe have tj ∈ Sub(E0, tn). Therefore ti /∈ Sub(tj). Moreover j ∈ Ω implies ti ∈ lj. By Lemma 9 we can
assume u and v are not in the same theory.
Since Sign(u) = Sign(ti)we have Sign(ti) 6= Sign(v). Thus by Lemma 11 there exists a rule (ljδti)↓ → (tjδti)↓ in Lv,g. By
minimality of j the only term r ∈ Ej−1 such that ti ∈ Sub(r) is ti itself and thus (ljδti)↓ = lj, cmin \ {ti}. Since ti /∈ Sub(tj)we
have (tjδti)↓ = tj. Thus there exists in Lv,g a rule l′j → tj with l′j ⊆ Ej−1 and ti /∈ L′j . This contradicts again j ∈ Ω .
ThusΩ is empty and the lemma follows. 
3.2. Protocol analysis
In this subsectionwe describe how protocols aremodeled. In the followingwe onlymodel a single session of the protocol
since it is well known how to reduce several sessions to this case. Our semantics follows the one by [15].
In Dolev–Yao’s model the intruder can intercept, block and/or redirect all messages sent by honest agents. It is also able
to send messages by masquerading its identity. Honest agents may know his identity, wrongly assume he is honest and
communicate with him on that basis.
Thus it has complete control over the communicationmedium.Wemodel this by considering the intruder is the network.
Messages sent by honest agents are sent directly to the intruder and messages received by the honest agents are always
sent by the intruder. From the intruder’s point of view a finite execution of a protocol is therefore the interleaving of a finite
sequence of messages he has to send and a finite sequence of messages he receives (and adds to his knowledge set).
We also assume the interaction of the intruder with one agent to be an atomic step. The intruder sends a message m
to an honest agent, this agent tests the validity of this message and responds to it. Alternatively an agent may initiate an
execution and in this case we assume it reacts to a dummy message sent by the intruder.
A step is a triplet (recv(x); send(s); cond(e)) where x ∈ X, s ∈ T(G,X) and e is a set of equations between terms of
T(G,X). The meaning of a step is that upon receiving message x, the honest agent checks the equations in e and sends the
message s. An execution of a protocol is a finite sequence of steps.
Example 3. Consider the following simple protocol where K is a symmetric key initially known by A only:
A→ B : {M ⊕ B}K
B→ A : B
A→ B : K
B→ A : M
Assuming the algebraic properties of⊕, symmetric encryption se(, ) and symmetric decryption sd(, )wemodel this protocol
as:
recv(v1); send(se(M ⊕ B, K)); cond({v1 = cmin})
recv(v2); send(B); cond({v2 = se(x, y)})
recv(v3); send(K); cond({v3 = B})
recv(v4); send(sd(v2, v4)⊕ B); cond({y = v4})
recv(v5); send(cmin); cond(v5 = M)
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Note that in our setting we can model that at some step i the message must match the pattern ti by adding an equation
vi
?= ti to S, as is done in last step of the above example. An agent may also verify previously receivedmessages when he get
new information: the condition {y = v4} relates the first and third messages and tells that the first message was encrypted
with the key received in the third one.
In order to define whether an execution of a protocol is feasible wemust first define when a substitution σ satisfies a set
of equations S.
Definition 6 (Unification Systems). LetH be a set of equational axioms on T(G,X). AnH-Unification system S is a finite set






. It is satisfied by a ground substitution σ , and we note σ |= S,
if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} uiσ =H viσ .
Let I=〈G, S,H〉 be an intruder system. A configuration is a couple 〈P,N〉where P is a finite sequence of steps andN is a set
of ground terms (the knowledge of the intruder). From the configuration 〈(recv(x); send(s); cond(e)) · P,N〉 a transition
to (P ′,N ′) is possible iff there exists a ground substitution σ such that xσ ∈ NI, σ |= e, N ′ = N ∪ {sσ } and P ′ = Pσ .
Trace-based security properties like secrecy can be reduced to the following Execution feasibility problem.
Execution feasibility
Input: an initial configuration 〈P,N0〉
Output: SAT iff there exists a reachable configuration 〈∅,M〉
3.2.0.1. Protocol insecurity. A major security problem is to decide whether the intruder can deduce a secretm from a finite
sequence of message exchanges P . This problem can be reduced to the execution feasibility of a protocol by appending a last
step:
S = recv(x); send(cmin); cond(x = m)
to P . The problem of insecurity with respect to secrecy of m after P is equivalent to the feasibility of the execution of P · S.
We now reduce the execution feasibility problem to the resolution of constraint systems.
3.3. Constraint systems
We nowmodel an execution of a protocol by a constraint problem C.
Definition 7 (Constraint Systems). Let I = 〈G, S,H〉 be an intruder system. An I-Constraint system C is denoted: ((Ei B
vi)i∈{1,...,n}, S) and it is defined by a sequence of couples (Ei, vi)i∈{1,...,n} with vi ∈ X and Ei ⊆ T(G) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
Ei−1 ⊆ Ei for i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and by anH-unification system S.
An I-Constraint systemC is satisfied by a ground substitution σ if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}we have viσ ∈ Eiσ and if σ |=H S.
If a ground substitution σ satisfies a constraint system C we denote it by σ |=I C.
Constraint systems are denoted by C and decorations thereof. Note that if a substitution σ is a solution of a constraint
systemC, by definition of constraints and of unification systems the substitution (σ )↓O is also a solution ofC. In the context
of cryptographic protocols the inclusion Ei−1 ⊆ Eimeans that the knowledge of an intruder does not decrease as the protocol
progresses: after receiving a message an honest agent will respond to it. This response can be added to the knowledge of an
intruder who listens to all communications.





?= cmin , v2 ?= se(x, y) , v3 ?= B , y ?= v4, v5 ?= M
}
The protocol execution for intruder I with initial knowledge {cmin} is then expressed by the constraint:
C = (( cmin B v1,
cmin, se(M ⊕ B, K) B v2,
cmin, se(M ⊕ B, K), B B v3,
cmin, se(M ⊕ B, K), B, K B v4),
cmin, se(M ⊕ B, K), B, K , sd(v2, v4)⊕ B B v5, S)
Weare not interested in general constraint systems but only in those related to protocols. In particularwe need to express
that amessage to be sent at some step i should be built from previously receivedmessages recorded in the variables vj, j < i,
and from the initial knowledge. To this end we define:
Definition 8 (Deterministic Constraint Systems). We say that an I-constraint system ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n}, S) is deterministic if
for all i in {1, . . . , n}we have Var(Ei) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi−1}.
The decisionproblemsweare interested in are the satisfiability and the ordered satisfiabilityof intruder constraint systems.
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Satisfiability
Input: an I-constraint system C
Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution σ such that: σ |=I C.
In order to be able to combine solutions of constraints in component theories to get a solution for the full theory these
solutions have to satisfy some ordering constraints too. Intuitively, this is to avoid introducing cycle when building a global
solution. This motivates the following definition:
Ordered Satisfiability
Input: an I-constraint system C, X the set of all variables and C the set of all free constants occurring in C
and a linear ordering≺ on X ∪ C .
Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution σ such that:{
σ |=I C
∀x ∈ X and ∀c ∈ C, x ≺ c implies c /∈ Subsyn(xσ)
The main result of this paper is a modularity result that can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1. If the ordered satisfiability problem is decidable for two intruders 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and 〈F2, S2, E2〉 for disjoint signatures
F1 and F2 then the satisfiability problem is decidable for the intruder 〈F1 ∪ F2, 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 , E1 ∪ E2〉.
This result is obtained as a consequence of Algorithm 1 for solving U-constraints using algorithms for solving ordered
satisfiability for intruders 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and 〈F2, S2, E2〉 given in Section 5. The soundness and completeness proofs of this
algorithm rely on the results of next section.We prove in Section 6 that it suffices to be able to solve deterministic constraint
systems in component theories.
4. Bound solutions of constraint systems
We recall that the intruder systemU is the union of the two intruder systems 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and 〈F2, S2, E2〉. In this section
we let C = ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n}, S) be a deterministic constraint problem on signature F and σ be a normal substitution that
satisfies C. We assume cmin ∈ E1 and Cspe ⊆ Sub(C). We are going to show in this section that a solution can be built
uniquely from subterms occurring in C.
From now we say a ground term is bound if it is bound by σ to some term in Sub(C), unless otherwise specified. In the
same way a term is free if it is free in Sub(C). We say a substitution σ is bound if for all variables x in its support all terms in
Sub(xσ) are bound by σ in Sub(C).
In the rest of this sectionwe first prove in Section 4.1 that if s is a free subterm of σ then replacing it by cmin in derivations
yields new derivations (i.e. no deduction power is lost.) Then we prove that if C is satisfiable there exists a solution σ of C
which is bound (Section 4.2).
4.1. Stability of derivations by replacement of free subterms
First we prove that when replacing a free term s in σ by the constant cmin we still obtain a derivation. The proof of the
following lemma relies on the hypothesis above that the constraint system C is deterministic and σ is normal.
Lemma 13. Let s /∈ Cspe be a term such that s ∈ Sub((Ekσ)↓) for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Then either there exists i < k such that
s ∈ Sub(viσ) or there exists m ∈ Sub(Ek) such that (mσ)↓ = s and in that case either Sign(s) = Sign(m) or m is a constant.
Proof. Since the constraint system is deterministic we have
Sub((Ekσ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(Ek)σ )↓ ∪ Sub(v1σ , . . . , vk−1σ) ∪ Cspe
Assume that there is no i < k such that s ∈ Sub(viσ). Then s /∈ Cspe implies there existsm ∈ Sub(Ek) such that (mσ)↓ = s.
By s /∈ Cspe and Lemma 6 there exists u ∈ Sub(m) such that (uσ)↓ = s and Sign(u) = Sign(s). 
The next lemma is a one-step version of Lemma 15.
Lemma 14. Let G be a finite set of normalized terms with cmin ∈ G, let r and s be two normalized terms with s /∈ Cspe, let lr be
the rule r1, . . . , rn → r ∈ Lu,g, ls be the rule s1, . . . , sm → s ∈ Lv,g. Assume moreover Sign(v) = Sign(s) and:
G→ls G, s→lr G, r, s
Then either (rδs)↓ ∈ (Gδs)↓ or:
(Gδs)↓ →U (Gδs)↓, (rδs)↓
Proof. Assume (rδs)↓ /∈ (Gδs)↓ and thus s 6= r . By Lemma 9 we can safely assume Sign(u) 6= Sign(v). Thus the assumption
Sign(s) = Sign(u) implies Sign(s) 6= Sign(v). The result is then a trivial consequence of Lemma 11. 
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Lemma 15 will be applied with s a free term in a solution σ in Lemma 16. It permits us to characterise minimal solutions
of a constraint satisfaction problem.
Lemma 15. Let E and F be finite sets of normalized terms with cmin ∈ E. Let s, t be two normalized terms not in Cspe with
s ∈ E \ Sub(E) and t ∈ E ∪ F . We have:
(tδs)↓ ∈ ((E ∪ F)δs)↓
Proof. First let us note that if s /∈ Sub(E, F , t) then one has t = tδs, E = Eδs and F = Fδs. Since E, F and t are normalized
the result is trivial.
Following the hypothesis s /∈ Sub(E)we now assume s ∈ Sub(F , t). By Lemma 12 there exists a well-formed derivation
Ds without stutter starting from E of goal s:
E = E0 →U E1 →U · →U En
with s ∈ En. Since s /∈ Sub(E)∪Cspe Lemma 8 and the fact that Ds is without stutter imply that the last rule is a rule ls → Lu,gs
with s /∈ Sub(En−1) and Sign(u) = Sign(s). Since the derivation is well-formed we have ls ⊆ Sub(E, s). Let H = En−1. We
have E ⊆ H and thus t ∈ H ∪ F ∪ {s}.
Let Dt be a well-formed derivation without stutter starting from H ∪ F ∪ {s} of goal t and let D be the concatenation of
the two sequences of rules in Ds and Dt , possibly removing unnecessary rules (those creating a term already present). Then
D defines a derivation from E ∪ F of goal t . This derivation is without stutter by construction and well-formed since Ds and
Dt are well-formed and s ∈ Sub(F , t). Let (Gi)i∈{1,...,k} be the sequence of sets appearing in this derivation. Let us prove that
when allowing stutters (i.e. (Giδs)↓ = (Gi+1δs)↓) the sequence (G0δs)↓ → · · · → (Gkδs)↓ is also a derivation.
By contradiction let G→ lr→rG′ be the first transition in D such that (Gδs)↓ 6→L (G′δs)↓ and (G′δs)↓ 6= (Gδs)↓. The rule
has not been applied in Ds since otherwise either:
• s ∈ Sub(lr , r) implies r = s and thus (Gδs)↓ = (G′δs)↓
• s /∈ Sub(lr , r) implies one can apply the same rule on (Gδs)↓ and this would lead to (G′δs)↓.
Therefore the rule l→ r has been applied in Dt . Consider now the sequence:
G \ s→ls→s G→lr→r G, r = G′
Since ls → s ∈ Lu,g with Sign(u) = Sign(s) Lemma 14 implies that either (G′δs)↓ = (Gδs)↓ or that (Gδs)↓ → (G′δs)↓ is a
valid transition, thus contradicting the choice of G and G′. 
4.2. Existence and properties of bound solutions
We now prove that if C is satisfiable then it is satisfied by a bound substitution. First we prove it is possible to replace
one free term s by the minimal constant.
Lemma 16. If there exists x ∈ Var(C) and s ∈ Sub(xσ) such that s is free in Sub(C) for σ then (σδs)↓ |= C.
Proof. Let σ ′ = (σδs)↓. Note that s free implies s /∈ Cspe.
First let us prove that σ ′ |= S. Since s is free in Sub(C) Lemma 5 implies that for all equations s ?= t in S we have
(sσ)↓ = (tσ)↓ implies (sσ ′)↓ = (tσ ′)↓.
Let us nowprove that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} if there is a derivation starting from (Eiσ)↓ of goal viσ then there is a derivation
starting from (Eiσ ′)↓ of goal viσ ′. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and consider the set:
Ωs = {i | s ∈ Sub((Eiσ)↓, viσ)}
If j /∈ Ωs we have (Ejσ)↓δs = (Ejσ)↓ and vjσ = vjσδs. Since s is free Lemma 5 implies (Ejσ ′)↓ = (Ejσ)↓ and vjσ ′ = vjσ .
Thus by assumption there exists a derivation starting from (Ejσ ′)↓ of goal vjσ ′.
Thus ifΩ = ∅ the Lemma is valid. OtherwiseΩ 6= ∅ and we can consider the minimum index i0 inΩ . By minimality of
i0 and by Lemma 13 we have s /∈ Sub((Ei0σ)↓) and thus s ∈ Sub(vi0σ). By Lemma 10 this implies s ∈ (Ei0σ)↓ .
For j ∈ Ω let Fj = (Ejσ)↓ \ (Ei0σ)↓. By (Ejσ)↓ = (Ei0σ)↓ ∪ Fj and s ∈ (Ei0σ)↓ \ Sub((Ei0σ)↓)we can apply Lemma 15 to
obtain a derivation D′j starting from ((Ejσ)↓δs)↓ of goal vjσ ′. Since s is free Lemma 5 implies D′j is a derivation starting from
(Ejσ ′)↓ of goal vjσ ′.
Thus for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a derivation starting from (Eiσ ′)↓ of goal viσ ′ 
The proof of Proposition 9 is a direct consequence of Lemma 16 and exploits the well-foundedness of the order < to
prove it is possible to iteratively replace all free subterms.
Proposition 9. Let C be a satisfiable constraint system. There exists a normal bound substitution σ such that σ |= C.
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Proof. Consider the set Σ of normal substitutions that satisfy C. By hypothesis Σ is not empty. Let σ be a minimal
substitution in Σ for the total ordering < on ground terms extended to substitutions by considering their co-domains as
finite multisets of ground terms. Let us prove σ is bound to C.
By contradiction assume there exists s free in Sub(σ ) and let σ ′ = (σδs)↓. By Lemma 16 we also have σ ′ |= C. By
monotony of<we have σ ′ < σ . By definition of Rwe have (σ ′)↓ ≤ σ ′. Thus (σ ′)↓ ∈ Σ and (σ ′)↓ < σ which contradicts
the minimality of σ . 
Note that the notion of subterm used throughout this paper implies in general we have an infinite number of bound
substitutions. It is thus not possible to use Proposition 9 to directly guess a substitution satisfying a constraint system C.
However this notion is sufficient to permit us to combine decision procedures. In next lemma we prove that instantiating
the constraint C by a bound substitution does not introduce any new subterm.
Lemma 17.
Sub((Sub(C)σ )↓) = (Sub(C)σ )↓
Proof. Let S = (Sub(C)σ )↓. We have S ⊆ Sub(S). The converse inclusion Sub(S) ⊆ S follows directly from:
Sub((Sub(C)σ )↓) ⊆ (Sub(C)σ )↓ ∪ Sub(Var(C)σ ) ∪ Cspe
Since σ is bound we have Sub(Var(C)σ ) ⊆ (Sub(C)σ )↓ and by hypothesis we have Cspe ⊆ Sub(C). 
5. Combination of decision procedures
We introduce Algorithm 1 for solving satisfiability of constraint systems for the unionU of two intruders systems I1 =
〈F1, S1, E1〉 and I2 =〈F2, S2, E2〉with disjoint signaturesF1 andF2. We explain this algorithm in Section 5.1, thenwe prove
its soundness (Section 5.2) and completeness (Section 5.3). Finally we partially prove Theorem 1 in Section 5.4.
5.1. Combination algorithm
First let us explain Algorithm 1:
Step 2 The algorithm input is aU-Constraint system (D, S). An equational system S is homogeneous if for all u ?= v ∈ S,
u and v are both pure 1-terms or both pure 2-terms. It is well known that equational systems can be transformed
into equivalent (w.r.t. satisfiability) homogeneous systems. Thus we assume that S is homogeneous without loss
of generality.
Step 3 abstracts every subterm t of C by a new variableψ(t). A choice ofψ such thatψ(t) = ψ(t ′)will lead to solutions
that identify t and t ′.
Steps 4–6 assign non-deterministically a signature to the root symbol of the subterms of C instantiated by a solution. The
choice th(ψ(t)) = 0 corresponds to the situation where t gets equal to a free constant.
Steps 7–10 choose and order non-deterministically the intermediate subterms in derivations that witness that the solution
satisfies the constraints inD .
Step 11 defines a constraint problem C ′ collecting the previous choices on subterms identification, subterms signatures
and derivation structures.
Step 12 splits the problem S′ in two pure subproblems.
Step 13 splits non-deterministically the problemD ′, that is we select for each E B v inD ′ an intruder system to solve it.
Step 14 guesses an ordering on variables: this ordering will preclude the value of a variable from being a subterm of the
value of a smaller variable. This is used to avoid cycles in the construction of the solution.
Step 15 solves independently the 2 pure subproblems obtained at steps 12–13. In Ci the variables qwith th(q) 6= iwill be
considered as free constants.
As in previous section we assume, with the notations of the algorithm, Cspe ⊆ Sub(C) and cmin ∈ E1. Recall that we say
a normal substitution σ is bound if for all variables xwith xσ 6= x and for all t ∈ Sub(xσ) there exists u ∈ Sub(C) such that
(uσ)↓ = t .
We are now ready to show that Algorithm 1 is sound and complete.
5.2. Correctness
The soundness of Algorithm 1 is a consequence of the two results below. Together they show that if the algorithm
produces satisfiable Ii-constraints (i = 0, 1) at Step 15. then the input U-constraint system is satisfiable. The notations
below refer to the ones in Algorithm 1.
Lemma 18. If there exists C ′ satisfiable at Step 11 then C is satisfiable.
Proof. Assume there exists C ′ chosen from C as in the algorithm and a substitution σ such that σ |=U C ′. We can check
easily that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
1. for all elements t of Qiσ there exists a derivation Dt from ψ(Ei)σ of goal t;
2. there exists a derivation Dvi starting from ψ(Ei)σ ∪ Qiσ of goal ψ(vi)σ ;
3. the concatenation of all former derivations yields a derivation starting in ψ(Ei)σ of goal ψ(vi)σ .
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Algorithm 1 Combination Algorithm
1: SolveU(C)
2: Let C = ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n}, S)with S homogeneous.
3: Choose ψ an application from Sub(C) toX \ Var(C)
and let Q = ψ(Sub(C))
4: for all q ∈ Q do
5: Choose a theory th(q) ∈ {0, 1, 2}
6: end for
7: for i = 1 to n do
8: Choose Qi ⊆ Q
9: Choose a linear ordering over the elements of Qi say (qi,1, . . . , qi,ki)
10: end for
11: Let C ′ = (D ′, S′) where{
S′ = S ∪
{
z ?= ψ(z) | z ∈ Sub(C)
}
D ′ = ∆1, . . . ,∆i, . . .∆n
and∆i = (Ki,Q<ji B qi,j)j∈{1,...,ki}, (Ki,Qi B ψ(vi))with{
Ki = ψ(Ei) ∪⋃i−1j=1 Qj
Q<ji = qi,1, qi,2, . . . , qi,j−1
12: Split S′ into S1, S2 such that S′ = S1 ∪ S2 and:S1 =
{




z ?= z ′ ∈ S′ | z, z ′are pure 2-terms
}
13: Split non-deterministicallyD ′ intoD1,D2
14: Choose a linear ordering≺ over Q .
15: Solve Ci = (Di, Si) for intruder Ii with linear ordering≺ for i ∈ {1, 2}
16: if both are satisfied then
17: Output: Satisfied
18: end if
Since σ is solution of S′ and σ |= S, for all t, t ′ ∈ Sub(C) we have (tσ)↓ = (t ′σ)↓ if ψ(t) = ψ(t ′). Hence there are
derivations starting from (Eiσ)↓ of goal viσ for all i ∈ {1, ..n}, respectively. Therefore σ |=U C. 
Nowwe prove that the combination part is sound. This proof follows the lines of the soundness proof for the combination
of unification algorithms by [19].
Proposition 10. Assume that at Step 15 for i = 1, 2, σi is a solution of Ci = (Di, Si) for intruder Ii. Then we can build a solution
σ of C ′ for intruderU at Step 11.
Proof. We can assume up to renaming that σi maps every variable of Ci to a term that contains new variables (away from
C) or variables x with th(x) 6= i that are considered as free constants in Ci. Let us define σ by induction on ≺. Let x be the
least variable for ≺ and i ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that th(x) = i. We define xσ = xσi. Assume now that all yσ for y ≺ x have been
defined and that th(x) = i. If i = 0 then xσ = x. Else, since σi satisfies the linear order restriction, the variables y1, . . . , ym
of index j 6= i that occurs in xσi (and considered as free constants in Ci) have to be smaller than x with respect to≺. Hence
by induction σ is already defined on y1, . . . , ym and we can take xσ = xσiσ (considering now the yi as variables). We can
show as in [19] that σ |= S′.
Now let us consider E B v an element ofDi. Since σi is a solution of Ci we have a derivation Eσi →∗Ii vσi. By replacing in
this derivation all the variables z such that th(z) 6= i (that were considered as free constants in Ci) by zσ we get a derivation
Eσ →∗U vσ . This reasoning applies to all constraints inD1 ∪D2 and therefore σ is a solution ofD ′ and finally of C ′ too. 
5.3. Completeness
Proposition 11. If C satisfiable then there exists C1 and C2 satisfiable at Step 15 of the algorithm.
Proof. First let us prove that the 11 first steps of the algorithm preserve satisfiability. Assume C is satisfiable. By
Proposition 9 there exists a normal bound substitution σ which satisfiesC. Defineψ to be a function such thatψ(t) = ψ(t ′)
if and only if (tσ)↓ = (t ′σ)↓. Thus by Lemma 17 there exists a bijection φ from Q to Sub((Sub(C)σ )↓). We let th(q) = i if
Sign(φ(q))= Fi and th(q) = 0 if Sign(φ(q)) = ⊥. Note that by the construction of S′ and the choice of ψ we can extend σ
on Q by qσ = (ψ−1(q)σ )↓.
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For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} by Lemma 12 we can consider a well-formed derivation Di starting from Fi = (Eiσ)↓ and of goal
gi = viσ :
Di : Fi →U Fi, ri,1 →U · · · →U Fi, ri,1, . . . , ri,ki →U Fi, ri,1, . . . , ri,ki , gi
We have Sub(Fi, gi) ⊆ Sub((Sub(Cσ))↓). Since the derivation is well-formed we have
{
ri,1, . . . , ri,ki
} ⊆ Sub(Fi, gi). By
Proposition 9, Sub((Sub(Cσ))↓) = (Sub(Cσ))↓ Thus the function φ−1 is defined for each ri,j. Let qi,j = φ−1(ri,j) and Qi be
the sequence of the qi,j.
The algorithm will non-deterministically produce a C ′ corresponding to these choices and satisfied by σ (extended over
Q by qσ = q˜) by construction.
Since S is satisfiable, following the lines of Baader and Schulz [19] permits to prove that S1 and S2 are satisfiable with
the linear constant restriction≺ chosen such that q ≺ q′ implies q′σ is not a subterm of qσ .
We choose the sequence of constraints inD1 (resp.D2) to be the subsequence of constraints F B q fromD ′ such that the
corresponding transition in the solution was performed by a rule in Lu,g with Sign(u) = F1 (resp.F2). By construction these
two systems are satisfiable. 
5.4. Combining solutions of subsystems
We can now prove the main theorem of this article. It is stated for the combination of two intruders but can easily be
generalized to n intruders over disjoint signatures F1, . . . ,Fn.
Theorem 1. If the ordered satisfiability problem is decidable for two intruders 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and 〈F2, S2, E2〉 for deterministic
constraint problems over disjoint signatures F1 and F2 then the satisfiability problem is decidable for deterministic constraint
problems for the intruder 〈F1 ∪ F2, 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 , E1 ∪ E2〉.
Proof. Propositions 11 and 10 imply that if the ordered satisfiability problem are decidable for two intruders I1 and I2 over
disjoint signature and for arbitrary constraint problems then the satisfiability problem is decidable for the union of these
two intruders and for deterministic constraint problems.
In Section 6 we prove that it is sufficient to assume that ordered satisfiability problems are decidable for each intruder
for deterministic constraint problems to derive the decidability for their union. 
6. Deriving deterministic constraint systems
6.1. Structure of bound solutions
The results of this subsectionwill be used in Proposition 15. In the derivations associated to a bound solution, we identify
two kinds of terms: The past-bound terms (formally defined in the sequel) that can be partially inferred from previously
derived terms, and the remaining ones, the past-free terms. Then we construct a mapping from past-bound terms to terms
build from subterms of the constraint system. This mapping will allow us to split the initial problem into deterministic and
pure subproblems.
Let C = ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n}, S) be a deterministic constraint problem on signature F satisfiable for intruder systemU. By
Proposition 9 there exists a bound substitution σ such that σ |=U C. As usual we assume cmin ∈ E1 and Cspe ⊆ Sub(C). We
also define:{Ti = Sub(Ei) ∪ {v1, . . . , vi−1}
Zi = Sub(((Ti, vi)σ )↓)
Z =∪ni=1Zi
Intuitively Z is the set of terms that may play a role in the derivations. We say a term m is a prefix of a term t if (mσ)↓ = t
and Sign(m) = Sign(t).
For the purification of a constraint system we will need to order the terms in (Sub(C)σ )↓ according to the index of
the (instantiated) constraint where they occur for the first time. Given a term t ∈ Z we introduce its index ind(t) which
informally marks the first time t appears.
Definition 12. For all t ∈ Z we define ind(t) to be the first i such t ∈ Zi. If t ∈ (Sub(C)σ )↓ \ Z we define ind(t) = n+ 1.
Given a term s ∈ Zi we say that s is past-bound if there exists a prefix of s for σ in Sub(Ei). We say a term s is past-free if
it is not past-bound. Note that cmin is past-bound of index 1 by hypothesis. First let us reformulate Lemma 6 with the index
for terms not in Cspe.
Lemma 19. Let u ∈ Sub(Ei) and s /∈ Cspe be in Sub((uσ)↓). Then either there exists a prefix of s in Sub(u) or ind(s) < i.
Proof. By Lemma 6 and s /∈ Cspe either there exists a prefix of s in Sub(u) or there exists x ∈ Var(u) with s ∈ Sub(xσ). In
the latter case, since the protocol is deterministic we have x ∈ {v1, . . . , vi−1} and therefore ind(s) ≤ i− 1. 



















(Sub(C)σ )↓ (T ′, P ′)ψ−1◦ϕσ ,C◦ψo
Fig. 1. Relations between the functions introduced in Section 6.
A direct consequence of this lemma is that if s is past-free of index i ≤ n there is now ∈ Sub(Ei)with (wσ)↓ = s. Since
the constraint system is deterministic this implies in turn that there is no w ∈ Sub(Ei) with s ∈ Sub((wσ)↓). A second
consequence of this lemma is that if s is past-bound of index i and u is minimal in Sub(Ei) among the terms v such that
(vσ )↓ = s then u is a prefix of s. The rest of this subsection is concerned with the mapping of terms of Sub(C) to such
minimal terms (Fig. 1).
Next Lemma is also a restatement of Lemma 10 with the notions of past-free and past-bound terms.
Lemma 20. Let t /∈ Cspe be past-free of index i ≤ n and Di : F1 →∗ Fk be a derivation starting from (Eiσ)↓ of goal viσ .
Then there exists j ∈ {2, . . . , k} such that Fj−1 →Lu,g Fj with Sign(u) = Sign(t) and for all j′ < j we have t /∈ Sub(Fj′).
Proof. Let t be past-free of index i. By Lemma 19 there exists no u ∈ Sub(Ei) with t ∈ Sub((uσ)↓). Thus t past-free of
index i implies t ∈ Sub(viσ) \ Sub((Sub(Ei)σ )↓) and thus t ∈ Sub(viσ) and t /∈ Sub((Eiσ)↓). Thus the lemma is a direct
consequence of Lemma 10. 
Remark. Let t ∈ Sub(C) such that (tσ)↓ ∈ Z . Let us anticipate on the choices during the split into two constraint
problems in Algorithm 3. On the one hand if (tσ)↓ is past-free then Lemma 20 and σ solution imply that the first time the
class of t will appear as a subterm of a constraint it will appears on the right-hand side of a constraint (as a qi,j) and this
constraint will have to be solved in Ci with Sign(t) = Fi. On the other hand if t is past-bound we will show in Lemma 21
how t can be partially inferred from the subterms of C. Algorithm 2 permits to compute this partial inference once the first
choices of Algorithm 3 have been made.
Given a term t ∈ Z of index i ∈ n next lemma states it is possible to compute a special prefix of t .
Lemma 21. Let t ∈ Z \ Cspe be a past-bound term of index i ≤ n. One can compute from Sub(C) a prefix m of t such that
Var(m) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi−1} and for each u ∈ Factors(m) either (uσ)↓ is past-free and of index< i or is a prefix of (uσ)↓.
Proof. First let us flatten the set Sub(C) andwrite it as a couple (T ,P )where terms in T are pure andP is a set of equations
in solved form x ?= t with t ∈ T . The setP defines a substitution τP . Let ν : Sub(C)→ T be the bijection defined by ν(t) = t ′
iff t = t ′τP .
The substitution σ defines an equivalence relation≡σ on T , namely t ≡σ t ′ iff (ν−1(t)σ )↓ = (ν−1(t ′)σ )↓. The constraint
system C also permits to define a relation≺ on T , namely:
• If ν−1(t) ∈ Sub(Ei) and ν−1(t ′) /∈ Sub(Ei) then t ≺ t ′
• t ≺ t ′ if ν−1(t) ∈ Sub(ν−1(t ′))
Since i < j implies Ei ⊆ Ej in the one hand, and t ∈ Sub(t ′) and t ′ ∈ Sub(Ei) implies t ∈ Sub(Ei) on the other hand, ≺ is a
partial ordering on terms of T . We extend it into a total ordering<C .
These ordering and equivalence relation permit to define a function ϕσ ,C . Given a term t ∈ T , consider s = (ν−1(t)σ )↓:
• If s is past-free and if xt ?= t is in P , define ϕσ ,C(t) = xt ;
• If s is past-bound, let t ′ ∈ T be minimum for<C among the terms u such that t ≡σ u and define ϕσ ,C(t) = t ′.
Claim 13. Let t ∈ Sub(C) such that s = (tσ)↓ is past-bound and not in Cspe. Let t ′ = ν−1(ϕσ ,C(ν(t))). Then t ′ is a prefix of s.
Proof of the claim. Let i be the index of s. By definition of past-bound terms the set Ωs ⊆ Sub(Ei) of terms u such that
(uσ)↓ = s is not empty. By Lemma 19 and s of index i the minimal elements of this set are prefixes of s. The lemma follows
from the construction of ϕσ ,C ◦ ν that maps terms u ∈ Sub(C) such that (uσ)↓ = s to the image by ν of an element us ofΩs
minimal for the subterm relation. ♦
Let (T ′,P ′) be build from (T ,P ) by applying ϕσ ,C on all terms and by removing equations x
?= t for variables
corresponding to past-free terms. First let us note that since ϕσ ,C(u) ≤ Cu for all u ∈ T ) and since for each equation
x ?= t ∈ P and for all y ∈ Var(t) we have y <C x, the set of equations P ′ is still in solved form. Let τP ′ be the substitution
defined by P ’ and ν ′ = ϕσ ,C ◦ ν.
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Claim 14. Let t ∈ Sub(C) such that s = (tσ)↓ is a past-bound term of index i. Let t ′ = ν ′(t)τP ′ . We have:
• t ′ is a prefix of s;
• If x ∈ Var(ν ′(t)) then xσ is past-free;
• for all u non-variable factor of t ′, u is a prefix of (uσ)↓.
Proof of the claim. First, since ϕσ ,C(ν(t)) is a prefix of s, it is clear that by construction ν ′(s) is a prefix of s and thus so is t ′.
By contradiction assume t is a minimal term for<C such that the second point is false. Let x be a variable of t ′ such that
xσ is past-bound. Either x has been introduced during the flattening or x ∈ Var(C). In the first case, the fact that x has not
been instantiated by the application of τP ′ implies that x corresponds to a past-free term, which contradicts x past-bound.
In the second case, the fact that ϕσ ,C(ν(t)) ≤ sν(t) implies that either x is also a variable of t or that x is a variable of a term
in Sub(Ej) with j < i. Thus x ∈ {v1, . . . , vi−1} and xσ is past-bound. Thus ϕσ ,C(ν(x)) is defined and different from x, which
contradicts the construction of t ′ or the choice of t .
By contradiction assume now there exists terms t in Sub(C) such that (tσ)↓ is past-bound and ν ′(t)τP ′ does not
satisfy the third point. Assume t is minimal in this set for the order <C and let u be a non-variable factor of t ′. Since u
is by construction an instance by τP ′ of a variable xu of ϕσ ,C(ν(t)) it corresponds to a past-bound term s (i.e. there exists
t ′′ ∈ Sub(C) such that (t ′′σ)↓ = s and ν ′(t ′′)τP ′ = u) ♦ 
6.1.1. Auxiliary functions employed in the algorithm
A substitution σ defines a mapping fσ from Sub(C) to (Sub(Cσ))↓. Let Q be a finite set of variables away from C of size
|(Sub(Cσ))↓|. There is a bijection gσ ,Q from (Sub(Cσ))↓ to Q . The functions fσ and gσ ,Q define a mapping ψ from Sub(C)
to Q such that ψ(t1) = ψ(t2) iff (t1σ)↓ = (t2σ)↓. We now define some functions on Q . In this context QZ is the subset of
variables q ∈ Q such that g−1α,Q (q) ∈ Z .
First we define the function ind(·) on Q with
ind(q) =
{
ind(g−1α,Q (q)) If q ∈ QZ
n+ 1 Otherwise
Note that the actual value (uσ)↓ is not needed to compute ind(ψ(u)) for u ∈ Sub(C). It suffices to know (or guess) ψ and
the subterm relation on (Sub(Cσ))↓ for the case where (uσ)↓ is a past-free strict subterm of viσ .
We now define a function type(·) that associates to a variable q of Q a mark depending on whether g−1α,Q (q) is past-free
or past-bound. Note that this function may again be computed as soon as the subterm relation on (Sub(Cσ))↓ is known.
type(q) =
{
past-bound If q ∈ QZ and g−1α,Q (q) past-bound
past-free Otherwise
Note that a function ϕp(·) that associates to a variable q ∈ Q a term ϕp(q) satisfying the Lemma 21 may be computed as
soon asψ and type(·) are known. There exists several possible choices for ϕp(·) depending on the order of computation but
they all are valid. The Algorithm 2 permits to compute ϕp(·) for all terms in QZ .
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to compute ϕp(·)
for all q ∈ Q with type(q) = past-free do
ϕp(q) = q
end for
while there exists q ∈ Q with ϕp(q) undefined do
Letm ∈ Sub(C)with ϕp(ψ(m)) undefined
if ϕp(·)defined on all factors ofm then
Let ϕp(ψ(m)) bemwhere all factors u have been replaced by ϕp(ψ(u))
end if
end while
In Algorithm 2 the condition at Step 6 is always satisfied for constants of Sub(C).
6.2. Revised combination algorithm
Our aim is to prove that at Step 15 of Algorithm1 it is sufficient to try to solve theCi only in the case they are deterministic.
In order to do this we restrict the choices in order to demonstrate why this is possible. We also limit the guessing part by
adding a line where the subterm relationR on (Sub(Cσ))↓ is guessed. This gives the restricted combination Algorithm 3.
We are now ready to show that Algorithm 3 is complete. The correctness follows from Proposition 10 as the added
features only restrict the possible choices in the algorithm.
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Algorithm 3 Combination Algorithm for CP satisfiability
1: SolveU(C)
2: Let C = ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n}, S)with S homogeneous.
3: Choose ψ an application from Sub(C) toX \ Var(C) and let Q = ψ(C).
4: Choose a partial orderingR over Q 2
5: for all q ∈ Q do
6: Choose a theory th(q) ∈ {0, 1, 2}
7: Compute the index ind(q) ∈ {1, . . . , n, n+ 1}
8: Compute type(q) ∈ {past-free, past-bound}
9: Compute ϕp(q)
10: end for
11: for i = 1 to n do
12: Choose Qi ⊆ Q
13: Choose a linear ordering over the elements of Qi say (qi,1, . . . , qi,ki)
14: end for
15: Let C ′ = (D ′, S′) where{
S′ = S ∪
{
z ?= ψ(z) | z ∈ Sub(C)
}
D ′ = ∆1, . . . ,∆i, . . .∆n
and∆i = (Ki,Q<ji B qi,j)j∈{1,...,ki}, (Ki, ϕp(Qi) B ψ(vi))with{
Ki = ϕp(ψ(Ei)) ∪⋃i−1j=1 ϕp(Qj)
Q<ji = ϕp(qi,1), ϕp(qi,2), . . . , ϕp(qi,j−1)
16: Split S′ into S1, S2 such that S′ = S1 ∪ S2 and:S1 =
{




z ?= z ′ ∈ S′ | z, z ′are pure 2-terms
}
17: SplitD ′ intoD1,D2
18: Choose a linear ordering≺ over Q .
19: Solve Ci = (Di, Si) over Fi with linear restriction≺ for i ∈ {1, 2}




Proposition 15. If C is satisfiable then Algorithm 3will generate 2 deterministic and satisfiable constraint systems C1 and C2 for
I1 and I2 at Step 20.
Proof. Assume C is satisfiable. By Proposition 9 it has a normal bound solution σ .
Let K = (Sub(Cσ))↓. There exists a surjective function φ1 from Sub(C) to K such that φ(t) = (tσ)↓. Moreover there
exists an injection φ2 between K andX \ Var(C). We denote q˜ = φ−12 (q). Consider the following choices:
• we choose ψ = φ2 ◦ φ1, and let Q = ψ(Sub(C));• we chooseR such that for any t, t ′ ∈ K we have t strict subterm of t ′ iff φ2(t)Rφ2(t ′).• The theory chosen for q ∈ Q is Sign(q˜);
• The computation of the index and of whether q˜ is past-free or past-bound depends only onψ and on the subterm relation
in K . It can thus be computed once knowingR and ψ;
• ϕp(q) can be computed following Lemma 21;• For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} consider a well-formed derivation Di starting from Fi = (Eiσ)↓ and of goal gi = viσ :
Di : Fi → Fi, ri,1 → · · · → Fi, ri,1, . . . , ri,ki → Fi, ri,1, . . . , ri,ki , gi
Since the derivation is well-formed we have:{{
ri,1, . . . , ri,ki
} ⊆ Sub(Fi, gi)
Sub(Fi, gi) ⊆ (Sub(Cσ))↓
The function φ2 is defined for each ri,j. Let qi,j = φ2(ri,j) and Qi be the sequence of the qi,j.
2 Which corresponds to strict subterm relation.
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From now on we assume these choices and computations have been performed.
Claim 16. C ′ is satisfiable at Step 15.
Proof of the claim. Given the choices made it suffices to remark that by construction of ϕp(·) we have qσ = (ϕp(q)σ )↓
(see Lemma 21).
Thus the algorithm will non-deterministically produce a C ′ corresponding to these choices and satisfied by σ (extended
over Q by qσ = q˜) by construction. ♦
Since S is satisfiable, following the lines of Baader and Schulz [19] permits to prove that S1 and S2 are satisfiable with
the linear constraint restriction≺ chosen such that q ≺ q′ implies q˜′ is not a subterm of q˜.
6.3.1. Splitting
We consider the split choice inwhich the sequence of constraints in Eq1 (resp. Eq2) is the subsequence of constraints F Bq
fromD ′ such that the corresponding transition in the solution was performed by a rule in Lu,g with Sign(u) = F1 (resp.F2).
By construction and since (ϕp(q)σ )↓ = qσ these two systems are satisfiable. Then the Ci are purified. This means that if
ϕp(q) is in theory Fj with j 6= iwe replace it by q.
In a system Ci, if ϕp(q) 6= q and th(q) 6= i it can be replaced by q before solving Ci. Then the variable symbols q such that
th(q) 6= iwill be considered as constants when solving the system Ci.
Let us now prove that the systems Ci are deterministic at step 15.
Claim 17. Let q ∈ Q past-bound, q′ ∈ Var(ϕp(q)) with th(q′) = th(q). Then ind(q′) < ind(q) and q′ is past-free.
Proof of the claim. Since q is past-bound ϕp(q) is defined and different from q. Let i = ind(q˜) ∈ {1, . . . , n} and let
q′ ∈ Var(ϕp(q)) with th(q′) = 1. Let m be the term chosen and u ∈ Factors(m) such that ψ(u) = q′. We have Sign(u)
6= Sign(m). Thus if q′ is not past-freewe have th(q′) 6= th(q). We can conclude that q′ is past-free and therefore by Lemma 21
(used on Eind(q)) ind(q′) < ind(q). ♦
Claim 18. The constraint systems Ci = (Eqi, Si) (i = 1, 2) derived with the above choices are deterministic.
Proof of the claim. First we note that q is a variable of Eqi if th(q) = i. Let Eqi = (E ′j B qj)j and define Vj =
{
q1, . . . , qj
}
.
By contradiction assume the set J of indices j such that Var(E ′j ) 6⊆ Qj−1 is not empty and let j be the minimum of J and let
m ∈ E ′j such that Var(m) 6⊆ Qj−1 and finally let q such that ϕp(q) = m.
If q is past-free then m = q and thus q ∈ Ej \ Qj−1. But the first time a past-free term t appears in a derivation it is
deducted with a rule in Lu,g with Sign(u) = Sign(t). Thus by the choice during the split we have a constraint Ej′ B q in Eq1
with j′ < j. This contradicts q /∈ Qj−1.
Else we have m 6= q but by Claim 17 each q′ ∈ Var(ϕp(q)) is past-free and ind(q′) < ind(q). Thus by the choice during
the split there exists a constraint Ej′ B q in Eq1 with j′ < j.
Therefore j /∈ J and thus J = ∅, which proves the claim. ♦ 
7. Application to security protocols
In order to combine constraint solving algorithms for sub-theories we only need to show that ordered satisfiability is
decidable in each component theory. To illustrate the benefit of our approach we show that this is the case for several
theories encoding useful properties of cryptographic primitives (pair, XOR, exponential, encryption). A consequence of our
main result Theorem 1 is that we can decide the security of (finite sessions of) any protocol employing these primitives even
assuming their algebraic properties and even if they are employed all together.
7.1. Dolev–Yao theory with explicit decryption
We consider now the Dolev–Yao intruder IDY = 〈FDY , SDY , EDY 〉 over the signature FDY = {〈·, ·〉 , pi1(·), pi2(·), se(·, ·),
sd(·, ·)}with deduction system defined by
SDY = {〈x, y〉 , pi1(x), pi2(x), se(x, y), sd(x, y)}





sd(se(x, y), y)= x
First we note that we can get from EDY a convergent and finite rewrite system RDY simply by orienting the axioms from
left to right. Thanks to Theorem8.5. of Schmidt-Schauß [18] satisfiability of equational systemsmodulo EDY is decidable even
in presence of linear constant restrictions. The idea is that the so-called narrowing procedure modulo RDY terminates (since
rules right-hand sides are variables) and is complete for solving equations modulo EDY with linear constant restrictions.
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The algorithmof [1] for deciding intruderIDY -constraints can be adapted to generate a finite and complete set of symbolic
solutions. Then we can use the constant elimination technique of [18] to solve the ordered satisfiability problem: we apply
narrowing (i.e. instantiating and rewriting) to the complete set of symbolic solutions provided by [1] and then we eliminate
the resulting substitutions that do not satisfy the constant restrictions.
Proposition 19. Ordered satisfiability for deterministic constraint problems for the intruder IDY is decidable in NPTIME.
7.2. XOR theory
We consider now deterministic constraints problem over the signature F⊕ defined in Section 1.3.2. More precisely we
consider the intruder
I⊕ = 〈F⊕, {x⊕ y, 0}, E⊕〉
Let C = ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n}, S) be a deterministic constraint problem for I⊕.
Let A = {a1, . . . , am} be the finite set of constants occurring in the constraint C. There exists an isomorphism φ between
the set of ground terms in normal form over the signature F⊕ ∪ A and the vector space (F2)m. This isomorphism is defined
by: {
ψ(ai)= the i-th vector in the canonical base
ψ(x⊕ y)= ψ(x)+ ψ(y)
ψ(0)= 0
We now extend ψ on finite sets of terms. One easily sees that the vector subspace generated by ψ(E) is equal to the set
ψ(E ). We apply this to prove next lemma which permits to simplify constraint systems.
Lemma 22. One can compute C ′ = ((E ′i B vi)i∈{1,...,n}, S) from C such that
• σ |= C iff σ |= C ′
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the set E ′i is ground
Proof. By induction on i. We take E ′1 = E1 and the base case follows. Assume now that there is 1 ≤ k < n and for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, E ′i is ground and for all substitutions σ ,
σ |= ((E1 B v1, . . . , Ej B vk)i∈{1,...,k}, S) iff σ |= ((E ′1 B v1, . . . , E ′j B vk)i∈{1,...,k}, S)
Assume Ek+1 = Ek, u⊕vj for some vj ∈ {v1, . . . , vk}. Since σ satisfies Ej Bvj and since Ej ⊆ Ek we have vjσ ∈ Ekσ and, since
u⊕ vj ∈ Ek+1, we have uσ ∈ Ek+1σ . Conversely we have (u⊕ vk)σ ∈ (Ek, u)σ . This implies that (Ek, u)σ = (Ek, u⊕ vj)σ .
By iterating on remaining variables of uwe obtain a ground term u′ such that Ek+1σ = (Ek, u′)σ . The induction hypothesis
implies then that (Ek, u′)σ = E ′k, u′ for any substitution σ satisfying the k first constraint problems. Since E ′k, u′ is ground,
we can take E ′k+1 = E ′k, u′ and this terminates the proof by induction. 
From the lemma above we can assume now that all Ei are sets of ground terms. Thanks to isomorphism ψ , E B σ(v) is
equivalent to say thatψ(v) is a linear combination of elements fromψ(E). The unification system S can be expressed too as
a linear system on Z/2Z. Finally to take into account the linear constant restriction we need only to add for each constraint
x ≺ ai a new equation xi = 0 to express that the i-th coordinate of ψ(x) in the canonical basis is 0.
Then solvingC amounts to solve an affine systemon theZ/2Z-variables and thewhole process can be done in polynomial
time (in the size of inputs). As a consequence we have:
Proposition 20. Ordered satisfiability for deterministic constraint problems for the intruder I⊕ is decidable in PTIME.
We refer to [18,31] for a more detailed description of the translation from unification problems to linear systems and of
the resolution of such systems.
7.3. Abelian group theory
We consider in this subsection the case of an intruder I× = 〈F×, S×, E×〉, where F× is the signature {i(·), · × ·, 1}, S× is
the set of terms {i(x), x× y, 1} and with the equational theory:
E×

(x× y)× z = x× (y× z)
x× y= y× x
1× x= x
x× i(x)= 1
We reduce the decidability of I×-constraints to the satisfiability of affine systems of equations on Z. This reduction is
performed in two steps. First we prove that it suffices to consider ground sets Ei in the constraints, and thus that the vi are
linear combination of ground terms. The proof is the same as the one of Lemma 22 since when the intruder can build a term
t she can also build i(t).
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Lemma 23. One can compute C ′ = ((E ′i B vi)i∈{1,...,n}, S) from C such that
• σ |= C iff σ |= C ′
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the set E ′i is ground
This Lemma again implies that all variables vi are linear combination of a fixed set of ground terms. Second the unification
system is translated to a system of affine equations over Z. Since unification with constant elimination is decidable [18,31]
in PTIME we have next proposition.
Proposition 21. The ordered satisfiability problem for deterministic constraints and intruder I× is decidable in PTIME.
Example 5. We consider the case of an abelian group operator× and a deterministic constraint system
C =
(
a, b B× x, a, b, x× c2 × i(b)3, d, e B× z,{
y ?= c2)
})
with linear constant restriction: a ≺ b ≺ x ≺ d ≺ c ≺ y ≺ e. First we transform the constraint problem to have only
ground left-hand side of constraints:(
a, b B× x, a, b, c2 × i(b)3, d, e B× y,{
y ?= c2)
})
And we interpret it in Z5. Let{x= axa × bxb × cxc × dxd × exe
y= aya × byb × cyc × dyd × eye
The linear constant restriction implies the equations
S≺ = {xc = 0, xd = 0, xe = 0, ye = 0}
The unification problem is equivalent to the equations
Su = {ya = 0, yb = 0, yc = 2, yd = 0, ye = 0}





a = xa λ(1)b = xb 0= xc 0= xd 0= xe
λ
(2)
a = ya λ(2)d = yd λ(2)e = ye
λ
(2)
b − 3 · λ(2)c2×i(b)3 = yb 2 · λ
(2)
c2×i(b)3 = yc
















xc = xd = xe = ya = yb = yd = ye = λ(2)a = λ(2)d = λ(2)e = 0
yc = 2
The system SC has a trivial solution
λ(1)a = xa = 0 λ(1)b = xb = 0 λ(2)b = 3 λ(2)c2×i(b)3 = 1
Thus the deterministic constraint problem C is satisfiable for the linear constant restriction≺.
7.4. Combination of the above
Note that the complexity of the combination Algorithm 3 is bounded byNPTIME and by the complexity of solving ordered
intruder constraints in the sub-theories. Together with the results of Propositions 19–21 this implies:
Proposition 22. The ordered satisfiability problem for the union of IDY , I⊕ and I× is in NPTIME.
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8. Conclusion
We have proposed an algorithm for combining decision procedures for intruder constraints on disjoint signatures.
This algorithm allows for a modular treatment of algebraic operators in protocol analysis and a better understanding of
complexity issues in the domain. Since only constraint satisfiability is required from the intruder sub-theories the approach
should permit one to handle more complex operators. Some interesting intruder theories cannot be considered as disjoint
but rather hierarchical combinations. This is the case for the combination of an exponential operator with an abelian group
(for its exponents). We are working on an extension of our approach for this different type of combination.
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